Evil Alliance #2
The German Kaiser was growing increasingly uneasy about the rising influence of the pro-Soviet faction. Why had Germany and Russia been close allies in the first place? Because their old men were buddies, right? But those old men were gone now—exiled. For Germany, this military coup they deemed utterly impossible had left the Kaiser and his generals in a foul mood, and understandably so.
Yet to avoid facing that very military coup head-on, they couldn't reopen the Eastern Front. Better to stick with the pro-Soviet crowd, importing wheat and oil from the east. Bill wanted to hand Nicky back his throne, and the Junkers dreamed of bolder expansion, but right now, all Germany could claim was Poland—the land they already occupied. Even voices within the Soviet Union pushing to hand over Poland were making Germany's hardliners hesitate, connected as they were. With the West not even settled, was charging east really wise?
Why not just gobble up Poland and call it a day?
The East's weakness wasn't the issue at the moment. The real question was whether they could finish it off. That's what mattered. Even the German generals, their brains flooded with militaristic hormones, doubted they could push past Siberia all the way to Pyongyang. So, if they did open the Eastern Front, it would require an agreement with the Korean Empire. The problem? Korea was rejecting even the offer to split Russia in half.
Germany had no idea Korea would turn down all of Russia if that's what was on the table. The East was off-limits, like it or not. For Germany, maintaining the current ceasefire was the best they could hope for.
That left the West. With America's power swelling by the day, Germany needed to negotiate something viable there. France was a non-starter, and Britain was pushing for surrender, so the answer lay with America. But America had already joined the war, and they weren't about to back out looking foolish now. The Kaiser knew that. That's why he'd pulled out all the stops to prevent their entry in the first place.
Whatever Britain had promised America, it was a nightmare for Germany. France dragged Britain in, and Britain dragged America in. The worst domino effect imaginable.
But the Western Front, even more sealed than the East, had one key difference. Sure, the sea blocked it off, but could Britain, France, and America really stay that united? The Kaiser saw a hint of opportunity there.
If I can just pull off a ceasefire with America somehow, things revert to status quo. No—better yet. With the Eastern Front quiet and wheat and oil flowing from there, Germany would hold the advantage.
Countless diplomatic failures littered the path. Still, the Kaiser refused to abandon diplomacy. In his hands were signs of discord among Britain, France, and America over Algeria. The Soviet leadership's promise to abandon Poland. And for America, their top hypothetical enemy was number one: Britain. Their war plans devoted the most ink to the "Great War Against Britain"—the so-called Red Plan.
Britain had burned Washington, backed the slave republic in the Civil War. If not for Anglo-Saxon economic logic tempering revenge, proxy wars would have erupted long ago. That's why joining hands with Britain drew heavy backlash. First off, liberating colonies but allying with Britain and France? Split America's bloodlines, and it wasn't black and white—it was Anglo-Saxon versus German.
Pro-war, anti-war, even reverse pro-war sentiments swirled in the mix. Wilson and his administration sided with Britain over Germany's U-boats and pushed for intervention.
But was that the right call? Unless Germany was begging Mexico to join—which they weren't—America's entry felt forced on multiple fronts. Especially with Western rebels and those Mexican communist bandits still unresolved.
Yet Wilson plunged in. Britain offering to dismantle its empire, ceding America the top seat? Turning that down would be insane. Those Red Plans assumed massive American losses. Britain would suffer more, but Wilson's blame would stick. In exchange, a partial empire breakup made him the president who toppled the British Empire.
To his staff and advisors, even if Britain kept Ireland or India in federal form, it was fine. The point: not "colonies" anymore. That meant accepting American influence projection. Once the door cracked, Britain would yield the world to America. Their businesses would seamlessly become American ones. The president's ethnic self-determination rhetoric aside, his team knew this war profited America more than expected. Smart officers and civilians naturally backed intervention.
But then France poured cold water: denying Algeria was a colony. Handing Algeria to France was no big deal—America was friendly with them, no designs on it. Britain hadn't ruled out full Irish independence either. President's ideals aside, staff needed realism. The line was drawn. And that meant a line for America too—and Britain had seen it.
Britain, pressured on Ireland to offer "anything but independence." 'Hmm, we'll watch America's moves.'
If America affirmed Algeria as French homeland, Britain would stay quiet now but exploit it later. Masters of exception clauses, they burrowed into cracks. Demand principles? They'd shove exceptions back.
Affirm Algeria as colony? America was pressuring Britain first to dismantle its empire. France next. But matching Britain's pace meant prioritizing the Raj. Deny France's claim, and the empires unite, vetoing America as an ally.
Without France's global reach post-Britain, decolonization could drag indefinitely. Best for America: same standards for both, timed apart. But France's denial forced a choice: affirm, deny, or silence.
They'd been passively silent; now actively so. Still, the world would question why self-determination America ignored Anglo-French colonies.
They'd demand answers. Or say, 'Britain gets autonomy and hegemony nod without blood; France after we thrash Britain.' But that faded Wilson's war rationale. He'd cited German U-boats and Austro-Hungarian oppression. A soul-deep casus belli, promising postwar American golden age.
France wasn't just losing battles—they eroded the cause itself. In a way, better they lose militarily; it only dents their popularity. But France was tanking America's low war support.
A throbbing headache all around. That's why Germany's U-boat renunciation, massive reparations promise to America, and call for American mediation hurled a boulder into the chaos.
Germany could handle armistice or peace. France? Not so much.
The Supreme Leader's perspective: 'Toss Poland to Germany like dog chews, redirect Britain's Polish liberation demands at them.'
Soviet swallowing Poland and Germany? It hampers world revolution. Most see Berlin-fallen Soviets stronger, but as a communism expert, I say intact ones are deadlier. Drawn sword versus sheathed blade.
'The Soviets topple the world through revolution, not war.''Soviets aren't strong in war—they're strong in revolution.'
Of course, the Anglo-American devils attack via war, forcing Soviet revolution into wartime communism retreat. Stalinism or Trotskyism wins out. Bad for Korea. We're weak against Western gunboat diplomacy but strong versus Soviet revolution spread—our society embraces proletarians.
The West is weak to Soviet agitation but strong against Korea's total war—they gang up first. Soviets weak to our total war but strong in Western colonies—rousing the rejected.
Rock-paper-scissors. Korea had tiptoed carefully, enduring Western gang-ups just for Asian dominance.
Now a revolutionary totem called the Soviets planted next door. Feed the colonized, and Soviets rouse them first. Western eyes inevitably shift to the nearer snarling Soviets.
They see Poland shielding West from Soviets; I see Polish border guards shielding Soviets from West. That's why I backed Britain's Polish rebuild, Soviet Poland waiver. Even okay pulling borders back a bit.
Lately, even thinking strengthening Germany proper. Militaristic Germany lacks real colonies—stronger them, less focus on rear Soviets or distant colonies.
Now I want to try strong-arming too.
After endless compromise, Korea's turn. Choose compromise or force. Probably compromise again, but...