Evil Alliance #1
The Soviet Union's top leadership operated on democratic centralism. Local people's opinions rose upward through bottom-up and indirect elections, forming a circulatory structure where directives from above flowed back down. It was eerily similar to Korea. The Korean Empire worked the same way: local issues resolved at autonomous district levels, escalated to the center, then budgets allocated and sent back down. And that was the problem—Korea, meaning the Republic of Korea, leaned closer to democratic centralism than true democracy. He'd lived in the Republic of Korea in his past life, so when he pushed "democratic reforms," these limitations were inevitable.
He granted localities autonomy and gathered their input, but once he intervened in central meetings and a decision was made, he commanded compliance—somewhat coercively, somewhat undemocratically. The Republic of Korea had done the same, so he figured this stayed within the bounds of "democracy." Naturally, such brakeless circulation bred accidents and failures. It wasn't even particularly democratic. Yet the Korean Empire—not the Republic—had pulled off astonishing success within that framework. Compared to the old absolute monarchy, it looked like real democratization. The economy? Shrimp versus whale.
One-party dictatorship? Who cared, if the economy boomed. No wonder Lenin and his comrades, busy slamming bourgeois democracy and debating true democracy or one-party guidance, referenced Korea for Soviet reforms. They saw Korea as mostly right. Transitional phase especially: "Korea's reactionary and revisionist, sure, but its public ownership trend screams communism. Vital teacher—and warning—for true communism." Korea hadn't seized means of production without compensation, but land redistribution handed private plots to cooperatives, publicizing them. Communist state, check. In this world, land to the tiller was pure commie talk. Direction? Secondary. The act alone violated property—revolution. Communism equals revolution.
"Land distribution? Fine. Cooperatives? Collective farms better." Korea's capitalist-imperialist drift? Revisionist comrades, no shock. Communists figured all powers turned imperialist. Blame the world. Communism broke the chains—a party-loyal world, not state. To them, Korea strayed but hadn't crossed lines. No anti-proletarian cars; tractors universalized public production. Dividends to capitalists, but workers' shares paid prompt, unplundered. All wages daily, no delays. Korea merited equal talks. Advice sought, hands outstretched. Korea's blank checks sealed it. Comrades help comrades.
Not shoving the Soviets into war? Korea passed comrade test. All knew war benefited Korea. Britain, France demanded intervention—for half the Soviets. Korea refused, sacrificed, defended. Comrades should. Stand together, right? Korea's quirks? Guidance fixes it. But the real issue wasn't Korea. Soviet multi-layers sparked hardline pushback to rapid collectivization. Explained Korea ditching revolution. They wouldn't. Soviets—councils. Equality non-negotiable. Korea's inclusion national policy; Soviets' equality. Leader's pettiness versus Lenin's vanguard? Ironic. But neither optional.
Difference: inclusion demands our agency; equality assumes all have it. Soviets wanted world equality. Korea: self-agency first. All nations, all peoples agency. Korea especially. Ally with inequality? Sure. Agency trumped equality—agency first, equality after.
Asher slowly slid the historic agreement between Great Britain and the Korean Empire toward Prime Minister George. The very accord the PM had demanded he negotiate. Secret from France and America—for now. America had meddled, signed the naval treaty. Alliance? Time-limited. Neither could break U.S. promises. America barreled to superpower despite western revolts and southern clashes. No bamboozling the top dog. Consensus.
But alliances weren't just military. Economic diplomacy ruled ahead—no more battleship games. The PM himself prioritized economy over disarmament. Britain needed real alliance: economic. Korea countered U.S. economic push with partnership. Atlantic-Pacific Economic Community. Britain, forced to dissolve colonies into federations by America, got a fresh bloc from Korea. Tariff union, non-tariff ideal.
Premised on tight currency coordination: Britain's gold standard, Korea's future silver. Britain holds gold in Europe-Atlantic; Korea silver in Asia-Pacific. Split the world. Leader's London trip? Not mere naval cuts—he could've left that oath to the navy. He came to sign this. Britain liked it. Ditch colonialism, keep interests. Gold and silver flowed to both. Britain blocked Korea's econ drift, imported gold, dumped excess silver high. Desperate times—massive U.S. gold debt. Korea's Russian gold? Lifeline. America squeezed: "Liberate colonies—or else."
But Korea demanded liberation for gold too. Silver shift? Fine. Britain begged: "Land for gold." Korea: No liberation, no gold—homelands, autonomies, parliaments be damned. Britain caved to history. America shoved off the cliff; France pushed entente; Germany ignored pleas. "Grabbed what we could." Versus American decline or French trap, Korea's "join us" community thrilled. Hope surged.
Korea's silver exit? Trivial. Key: seize gold and silver, zero tariffs inside. Sovereignty? Sure—but economic colonies. Bonus: Korea joins. Silver, but gold-silver trade monopolized by both. Markets? Korea, China—Russia maybe. Britain's rationing economy screamed. Post-war terrified more than war. Warehouses empty. What would people think? But refill hope? Britain still had shots.