Chapter 373
Translator: crow
Chapter Title: Afghan War
While Korea was devoting all its energy to quelling the fallout from democratization, the Soviet Union found itself entangled in a major headache.
That headache was Afghanistan.
“What the hell is Amin doing that he can’t get Afghanistan under control?”
Shelpin, the supreme leader who prioritized domestic affairs over foreign ones, still couldn’t ignore Moscow’s deep involvement in Afghanistan, regardless of his preferences.
“We should probably increase our support there.”
The Soviet military pushed for active intervention in Afghanistan at this juncture.
*Domestic issues are headache enough as it is.*
Shelpin wasn’t thrilled about ramping up military spending.
But he couldn’t keep sweeping the problem under the rug forever.
If they let the mujahideen keep terrorizing Soviet personnel in Afghanistan indefinitely and threatening the communist regime, it could spill over into the Islamic regions of the Soviet homeland.
*Stabilizing the home front means we can’t ignore Afghanistan’s stability either.*
After much deliberation, Shelpin approved the option of intervening in Afghanistan.
Unlike the original timeline, the Soviets’ relatively late decision to intervene was largely due to the absence of CIA meddling.
In November 1982, the Soviet government dispatched combat troops to Afghanistan.
The great powers tacitly acquiesced to their military actions.
“The Reds’ maneuvers are annoying, but if this wears Moscow out, it’s not all bad.”
Afghanistan wasn’t strategically vital anyway.
In the original timeline, it had been a key point the Americans clung to until the end.
“The geopolitical situation’s different now.”
In the current reality, Afghanistan was just a poor agrarian nation on the fringes of the Soviet bloc, not a Cold War frontline.
Korea also silently approved of the Soviet military action.
“Better they take some losses than profit in the middle of it all.”
Even Britain, once an empire, and Europe welcomed the Soviets diverting military resources from Europe to Asia.
With all the great powers turning a blind eye, the Soviet troops faced no real opposition.
On top of that, the Soviets enjoyed an advantage they couldn’t have in the original timeline.
“The communist Afghan government is still intact since we didn’t overthrow the regime.”
That meant the communist Afghan army remained operational, significantly lightening the burden on Soviet forces.
But did that mean the Soviets only reaped benefits from the Afghan War?
Not at all.
The Soviet military had its own problems.
The biggest was the scale of the force.
“Deploying a massive army is just too burdensome.”
The military had demanded at least 100,000 troops to wipe out the mujahideen, but they were given only 20,000.
They’d also limited their role to supporting the Afghan army in pacification, so their war preparations were half-hearted.
Still, Moscow remained optimistic.
“It’s a fight between a regular army and militias, after all. What chance does a ragtag militia have against regulars with air power, helicopters, and tanks?”
Moscow’s perspective had some basis.
“Hell, think back to when we teamed up with Korea and crushed China.”
They had firsthand experience dismantling China, the world’s fourth-largest army at the time, in a flash.
No need to even mention the far inferior mujahideen.
With Moscow’s policy set in stone, Major General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov took command and launched operations to exterminate the mujahideen.
“Smoother than expected?”
The Soviet operations proceeded without a hitch.
With the Afghan government army not defecting to the rebels and no American arms flowing to the mujahideen, clearing them around Kabul was a breeze.
The supposedly impregnable Panjshir Valley was no different.
“They need weapons to fight.”
Deprived of both American aid and government army supplies, the mujahideen were sitting ducks against Soviet attack helicopters.
In just two weeks, Varennikov captured the natural fortress of the Panjshir Valley, dealing a mortal blow to the mujahideen.
“Militias are nothing, as expected.”
The Soviets and the communist Afghan government grew confident of victory.
But their taste of sweetness didn’t last.
“The Soviets aren’t our protectors—they’re invaders.”
As news of the mujahideen’s desperate resistance spread, anti-Soviet sentiment surged across the Middle East.
Countless young men from the region flocked to Afghanistan with weapons and money.
Among them was a young scion of the Bin Laden family, Osama bin Laden.
They mainly entered via Pakistan and Iran.
The mujahideen trained these fresh volunteers and deployed them mainly in rural and mountainous areas.
“If they control points and lines, we control the terrain.”
The mujahideen commanders weren’t fools.
They learned from their initial defeats and avoided direct confrontations with Soviet forces.
“We fight like Vo Nguyen Giap to win.”
Their model was Vietnam’s victorious general, Vo Nguyen Giap.
The mujahideen didn’t cling to fixed bases, flexibly shifting their strongholds.
They even abandoned areas with their families if necessary.
This shift to protracted warfare weighed heavily on the communist Afghan government and its Soviet backers.
“A prolonged war just means bleeding money.”
The Soviets felt a heavier burden than anticipated from the drawn-out conflict.
The grueling supply lines snaking through treacherous mountains were the greatest enemy in themselves.
Even transporting a single drop of water or bullet cost a fortune.
And that wasn’t the only burden.
“Even evacuating a single wounded soldier requires a helicopter.”
The cost of shipping casualties back to hospitals in the Soviet homeland was astronomical.
They were sustaining 20,000 troops, but the effective maintenance cost felt like supporting 200,000.
The aid to the communist Afghan army was no small expense either.
Fed up with the bills, Moscow pressured Iran and Pakistan.
“We’re sealing the Afghan border effective immediately.”
Iran, under Soviet influence, readily complied.
Pakistan outwardly submitted as well.
“We’ll do as Moscow says.”
But Pakistan had no intention of honoring its pledge.
“How do you even control the border?”
With millions of Pashtuns straddling the Afghan-Pakistani frontier and a border line that stretched endlessly, sealing it was impossible from the start.
Pakistan’s promise was mere lip service.
The mujahideen continued sourcing men and weapons through Pakistan.
*What a pain.*
In this bind, the Soviets could only rely on the communist Afghan army, their main numerical force.
The problem was that it wasn’t particularly competent.
“Fighting just the government army is like eating cold porridge.”
The mujahideen focused attacks on government forces wherever Soviet troops were absent.
Each time, the government troops dumped massive supplies and fled.
“We’re here for the paycheck, not to die loyal.”
The mujahideen treated these government units as their own supply depots.
“Why run separate logistics when these guys are our warehouses?”
The Soviets increasingly saw the communist Afghan army as unreliable.
The expeditionary force, 20,000 strong in January 1981, swelled to 25,000 by May and 40,000 by July.
This rapid buildup drove up war costs.
“If we’re doing this, deploy a huge force at once and stabilize the region!”
The military proposed committing a million troops to flatten Afghanistan in one go.
A million.
Moscow lacked the capacity to sustain that in Afghanistan.
*We’d go bankrupt.*
The federation was already strained by reform costs; they couldn’t pile on more.
Shelpin demanded they resolve the issue with current resources.
“Even nukes wouldn’t make that possible.”
Frustrated by the military’s endless calls for more resources, Shelpin considered an idea.
*Our army’s maintenance is expensive, but what about pulling in troops from satellite states where manpower’s cheap?*
Conveniently, the Soviets had one such state: China.
“Send Chinese troops to Afghanistan?”
“We’d have to pay them, of course, but it’d still be cheaper.”
The military viewed Shelpin’s idea positively.
“In dire straits, even a cat’s paw is welcome—Chinese troops will do.”
Moscow sat down with Beijing immediately.
“You want to send our army to Afghanistan?”
“In return, we’ll provide the funds and tech your economy needs.”
After some haggling, they agreed to dispatch 50,000 Chinese troops.
The Chinese intervention seemed like a game-changer for the Afghan War.
For a moment.
But the Chinese had one issue Soviet leaders hadn’t anticipated: motivation.
“Why fight someone else’s war that’s not even ours?”
In the original timeline’s Vietnam War, the U.S. motivated its allies with money.
They paid allied “mercenaries” less than American GIs, but the pay was so alluring that the allies often fought harder than their employers.
That didn’t fly with the Soviets.
“We can barely pay our own troops peanuts—how can we splash cash on Chinese soldiers?”
No money, no reason to fight.
The Chinese troops started slacking off soon after arrival.
With Chinese forces a bust, the communist Afghan army was even worse.
The Soviets painfully realized they had to fight the war with their own capabilities.
“Is there any end to keep pouring in troops like this?”
Skepticism arose in the Politburo, but Moscow had no choice.
Withdrawing now would be seen as abandoning a “communist ally.”
“Then what’s the point of propping up those Reds?”
They weren’t richer than Korea or America, nor did they honor alliances well.
Why keep them as figureheads?
Considering the gaze of other communist allies, cutting ties wasn’t an option.
Caught between a rock and a hard place.
The Soviets tasted the exact same dilemma America had in Vietnam.