Chapter 209
Chapter 209
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Translator: crow
Chapter Title: Blueprint
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1958 was the year of the rocket.
America, the Soviets, and Korea—all fired them off without rest.
While they mostly launched satellites, our missiles were test-fired for ICBMs and SLBMs, marking the key difference.
As we flaunted our military and technological might, nations wary of getting swept up in the US-Soviet standoff began quietly approaching Pyongyang.
"Security cooperation with us?"
"Over the long term, it might be good to build even closer ties."
This was worlds apart from the vague Third World idea we'd floated before.
They were openly signaling a desire to huddle under an umbrella with us as the leader of our own bloc.
"Your Excellency, this is our chance. Why not seize it and establish an axis on par with the US and Soviets?"
The dream sounded appealing.
But would forming a bloc right now truly benefit Korea's national interests?
Not in the slightest.
All it would bring is pushback from the US and Soviets.
Why would Moscow or Washington sit idly by while we tried to carve up their share of the world?
I had no desire to face their scrutiny before we were truly their equals.
"We're not even steady on our feet yet, and you're already trying to run? Even if Korea's economy matched the Soviets', would we really be on equal footing with them?"
I pointed out the bureaucrats' delusion.
The communists could compete with a superior America despite the weight-class gap not because their visible military power or tech was better.
It was communism.
That seductive ideology, which bred sympathizers everywhere, was the driving force behind the US-Soviet standoff.
Did Korea have anything like that?
Sure, we could tout Korean-style democracy, but it was little more than a fashionable ideology tailored for the convenience of the state, the military, or those in power.
When asked if it could truly serve the same role as communism, the honest answer was no.
So the time wasn't right yet.
Economic parity with the Soviets alone wouldn't put us on equal footing with the superpowers.
I brushed off the Third World vision again, but I didn't completely reject the overtures from these countries.
I accepted most offers for light security or economic cooperation.
'I said no for now, not forever.'
Long-term, I harbored ambitions to position Korea as the leader of the Third World.
In any case, whenever these visitors arrived, regardless of the talks, we rolled out a grand military parade for them.
The original-timeline Korea showcased traditional honor guards, but we deployed soldiers from the Imperial Guard Division in parade uniforms.
Seeing them in those jet-black uniforms, steeped in Prussian flair, stirred old memories.
'I somehow turned those guys into actual humans.'
Of course, I still wasn't entirely convinced they were fully humanized.
There was no guarantee they wouldn't pull some nonsense once I stepped down.
That was why, even at my age, I clung to the throne while grooming a successor.
"Your Excellency, this is where the Korean military's claim as Asia's strongest shines through."
"Asia's strongest? We aim for the world's."
This wasn't empty talk.
We couldn't match the US or Soviets in scale, but we'd poured massive effort into building an elite force rivaling them in quality.
Especially with non-commissioned officers—we'd invested heavily there.
"NCOs are the backbone of the military. How can you fight effectively in war if that backbone is weak?"
I raised their pay and provided barracks.
Thanks to this solid treatment, NCO retention rates were steadily climbing.
Of course, diverting resources to personnel meant mass production of military hardware lagged a bit.
Still, it was an investment worth making.
Even in the original Cold War timeline, the Soviets' failure to fix their weak NCO corps left them at a massive qualitative disadvantage against the West.
The saying that one Western tank company could smash a Soviet tank battalion stemmed more from the NCO gap than equipment differences.
"Why not take a spin in a tank? It's quite comfortable."
"Is that allowed?"
Most guests didn't pass up the chance to try our gear.
I used the parades as showcase booths for arms exports.
They left with deep impressions.
"The interior is spacious, and the environment is pleasant."
That was true of most of our equipment.
We prioritized user comfort and living conditions over raw specs on paper.
Even focusing on combat performance, military gear wasn't just for wartime.
It spent more time rolling around in peacetime.
And even in combat, holing up all day in uncomfortable equipment left soldiers fatigued, killing efficiency.
"Your Excellency, riding it myself, I get it now. I'd like to import some Korean gear—is export possible?"
"Of course. We'll send the latest models."
Unlike the stingy Soviets or Americans with their downgraded exports, we didn't play those games.
Why would we?
We were latecomers trailing the US and Soviets.
To devour the arms market, we had to offer advantages they didn't.
"But won't exporting cutting-edge weapons let our potential enemies study them?"
Of course it would.
But then use the profits to develop and deploy even newer models faster. Problem solved.
That was the 21st-century mindset.
And if that didn't pan out? No big deal.
We were a "Korean Monroe Doctrine" nation, reluctant to intervene beyond East Asia.
With little reason to shed blood on foreign soil, how much harm could arms exports really do us?
'Unless it's the US or Soviets spilling the blood.'
In that light, exporting top-tier weapons posed no threat to our interests.
It even helped by ramping up their maintenance burdens.
Of course, we held back on ultra-sensitive spots like the Arab Union, where we'd stick to older models out of deference to the Jews.
But to South America, Europe, Turkey, India, China, the British Commonwealth—we sold aggressively.
"What about submarines?"
"Absolutely."
We'd built up submarine tech from stolen German designs.
We were hitting snags evolving them into nuclear boats, but conventional subs were already world-class.
These sales efforts paid off: we closed 30 major arms deals in 1958 alone.
The golden age of K-Democracy was followed by K-Defense.
I didn't see K-Defense as mere exports.
Relying on another country for arms imports was tantamount to committing to alliance.
Even in the 21st century, nations demanded factories and tech transfers; in the 20th, depending wholesale on production was a given.
I planned to use these arms exports as hooks to sketch the blueprint for a Korea-led bloc.
Under the guise of doctrinal training and weapons handling know-how, we dispatched modest military advisory teams.
For countries we especially wanted to draw in, we offered "special perks" amid the exchanges.
"You mean India could launch a satellite too?"
"Not handing over a rocket—we'll just put your satellite in orbit for you."
"That's more than enough."
We were generous with "friend candidates."
We even gave top-tier ally Nanjing a shot at a satellite launch.
But we weren't total suckers.
Every handout came with "friend fees."
That was the difference between us and the US-Soviets.
'The superpowers bleed cash to avoid losing bloc members—we have no such need.'
Korea sat one step removed from their bloc wars, playing impartial judge in the international arena.
As I sketched this bloc blueprint, I publicly stressed Korea had no interest.
"Ah, we'll stick to our peaceful perch. Why would we leave the Free World to start a bloc?"
That was my stock response whenever anyone probed our intentions.
In truth, Korea's position as a "Free World member" with open access to Western markets was advantageous.
Economically, it was far more profitable.
But such growth couldn't last forever—that was the problem.
Once Korea overtook the Soviets economically, we'd become America's top watched rival.
Not a physical enemy, but an economic competitor.
Japan and West Germany had faced that scrutiny and US pushback in the original timeline.
And Korea wasn't under America's umbrella like them, so the wariness would double.
We needed to slowly prepare our own umbrella.
'Rain won't fall within 10 years anyway—no need to rush.'
Even if Korea surpassed the Soviets economically, Moscow's overwhelming military and communist ideology would keep America occupied for a while.
I figured 5–10 years.
That matched how long it took Japan and West Germany to surpass the Soviets and start taking US hits.
Still, I didn't worry too much.
Today's Korea wasn't some lightweight like them, helpless against a pounding.
Look how far we'd come.
Just yesterday, we were twisting limbs in fear of US pressure; now we were big enough to prepare countermeasures.
Ten more years of this growth, and we'd be a nation even America feared.
If I held the throne a bit longer, we might even take a swing at them.
The thought crossed my mind.