Chapter 2
Chapter 2
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Translator: crow
Chapter Title: I'll Stage a Coup (2)
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If there's a "textbook method" for everything in the world, then there must be one for coups d'état too.
As an aspiring coup plotter, I reflected on the footsteps of my proud predecessors in Korean coups.
Let's start with Park Chung-hee of the May 16 coup.
In the case of Army Major General Park Chung-hee, who led May 16, the coup wasn't meticulously prepared.
Intelligence had leaked out beforehand, and even civilian Prime Minister Chang Myon was aware of the military's suspicious movements.
As a result, the moment the coup began, Colonel Lee Kwang-sun of the military police surrounded the rebels' headquarters at the 6th District Command and tried to arrest all the key officers.
What saved the coup forces in their moment of crisis wasn't Park Chung-hee's leadership, but the quick thinking of the Korea Military Academy Class of 8 officers, Army Chief of Staff Chang Do-young's trolling, and the indecisive responses from the president and prime minister.
In that sense, Park Chung-hee wasn't suitable as a role model.
Honestly, it felt wrong to take a coup that succeeded by luck as the model.
So, what about Chun Doo-hwan of December 12, who broke through more organized resistance than during May 16?
At the time of December 12, Security Commander Chun Doo-hwan held the power of the military intelligence agency, the Capital Security Command, overwhelming the suppression forces with intelligence and securing victory.
Of course, without the private organization he'd nurtured over decades, the Hanahoe, even Chun Doo-hwan's meticulous plan wouldn't have had that much power.
But without the criminally incompetent Defense Minister Roh Jae-hyun and the indecisive command of Vice Chief of Staff Yoon Sung-min backing it up, even if Hanahoe's grandfathers were around, the coup had no chance of success.
In simple terms, the success of a "Korean-style coup" required the incompetence of the government and suppression forces as an essential element.
In that regard, there was one important fact I needed to address.
Was this country, the Korean Empire, incompetent at handling coups?
Unfortunately for me, this nation had recently experienced a coup.
That wasn't a good fact for an aspiring coup plotter.
Like most rebel leaders who staged coups, the current Army Minister, Marshal Park Han-jin, was pouring his heart into "coup preparedness."
He had expanded and reorganized the existing Army Counterintelligence Command into the "Army Security Command," and lined his direct lineage factions throughout the Security Command and the field units around the capital.
Park Han-jin had built such a thorough wall that preparing a proper coup was impossible.
Exaggerating a bit, not even a toothpick could slip through.
'For now, at least.'
But if a natural disaster or massive upheaval occurs, things change.
In wartime, when war breaks out, units expand, redeploy, rotate, or get replaced.
And in that moment, the regime's grip on the military reveals its weaknesses.
History shows it too.
In the Russian Revolution, the Tsar's reliably loyal Guard units were sent to the front lines, filled by newly conscripted units, creating the conditions for rebellion to ignite.
If war breaks out with China, Korea might face a similar pattern.
So, the opportunity will definitely come.
In the story itself, around year 39, there's even a "coup attempt incident," so it's not baseless optimism.
To make that happen, preparation is still needed.
'Building a private organization like Hanahoe would be the surest way.'
The problem was that Yi Seong-jun had no such private organization.
All he had was the intangible asset of "popularity."
That popularity was probably just "nice-sounding flattery" to please a general of imperial blood.
I decided to borrow an objective perspective from Jeong Gil.
"High-ranking officers or generals you meet privately, sir?"
"Yeah. People you see once a month outside our division or corps."
"Ah, when you went to the Army Ministry, you had a meal with the Logistics Division Chief."
"No, not official Army events—private meetings."
"There were none."
Huh?
No way. Yi Seong-jun, this guy, in a quasi-Prussian state, doesn't manage military connections?
Wow, this guy's really just living life carelessly.
Worse than me.
Doesn't he get scared living like that?
'Come to think of it, as imperial kin, he could live without worrying about it.'
In this case, his status was clearly a "penalty."
A general who doesn't put in the eeeeffort to build connections, dreaming of a coup?
Disqualified as a coup aspirant.
I pondered how to break through this serious situation.
What was needed to stand tall for a "coup" under such terrible conditions?
I decided to examine cases from foreign "coup predecessors."
In Mustafa Kemal's case, he used his national popularity from "Gallipoli" to bomb Constantinople (note: Ottoman Empire capital) and become head of state at the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
Napoleon, one common general among many in the military, was chosen as the knight in Sieyès' Brumaire Coup but seized the First Consul position based on popular support.
The lesson here is that a politician's popularity is a resource that can be converted into power.
'Popularity, huh. Nothing I can't do.'
I thought about overcoming the lack of a private organization with "national popularity."
But there was a problem.
In our Korean Empire, the ways to gain national popularity were.
"Ugh. Manjusraum. I've expanded the living sphere of the Korean people!"
"Fellow citizens! I've secured war reparations from China!"
"Boost factory utilization through war! Support the military for War Economy Option No. 1!"
Hmm. Just those.
Differentiating from these lunatics was tough too.
First, the national economy was doomed, so no money for anything.
Second, I'm a soldier, not a politician.
Third, what the people want is the same as those lunatics.
To gain popularity, I'd have to become an even bigger warmonger than them, but flooring the accelerator like that would land me a firing squad at a war crimes trial.
I'm staging a coup to survive, not the other way around.
I returned to square one.
'Cliches aren't popular for nothing.'
The cliché for coups is "winning over."
Even Park Chung-hee, who wrote the first success story in Korean coup history, diligently won over high-ranking officers and generals from KMA Classes 5, 8, and 9 to build his coup force.
Of course, winning over had several disadvantages compared to a private organization.
1. Risk of information leaks due to poor control.
Park Chung-hee suffered from leaks too, and cases like the 2016 Turkish coup failed outright.
2. Hard to identify recruitment targets.
Unless you can read minds, you can't be 100% sure of their actions.
3. Takes a lot of time.
Private organizations can act the moment they decide, but winning over means you can't move until the work is done.
Many coups fail because they're detected in the preparation phase.
'That's why differentiation is needed.'
I had no intention of offering position-sharing or merit-based rewards that prioritize benefits.
The core of my "winning over" was presenting a vision for the future—the blueprint for the future Korean Empire.
A prime example is the Young Turk Party's coup, shouting they would turn the Ottoman Empire into a "modern nation."
Like the Young Turks, I planned to sell "conviction" and faith to coup participants—that we could lead the nation on the right path.
The vision I'd present is developmental dictatorship.
Built on the three pillars of "anti-communism, economic growth, institutional modernization."
In a way, it's benchmarking Park Chung-hee's governance strategy.
But so what?
This Korean Empire is ruled by military boneheads with a beggar mindset that can't even reach that level.
Of course, whether I can execute developmental dictatorship well is unknown.
The U.S. needs to open markets and provide loans for me to run big like Park, and that's not happening.
Anyway, that's a problem for later.
'The immediate task is to gather friends to play the role of a quasi-Young Turk Party.'
Is there a way to recruit young officers without making noise?
I arrived at the answer soon enough.
What's my specialty?
Writing—translation, to be precise.
A man who makes a living writing books should use his strengths.
First, I need to let people know who I am.
How?
Through books and newspapers.
By firmly showing my vision that way, I'll create followers.
As my voice builds up, some will take interest in my claims, watch, and eventually raise me as their leader.
"Adjutant."
"Yes, General."
"Set up visits to Goryeo Daily and Dongyang Daily by tomorrow."
These two newspapers were representative dailies of Goryeo, representing most of the empire's conservative readers at present.
I planned to raise my voice targeting these conservative citizens.
The reason was simple: the military was conservative.
Sure, there were progressive officers in the military too, but they were a negligible minority unable to influence the mainstream.
"The newspapers?"
"Yes."
"Understood."
Oh, radio too.
Why did I forget the greatest weapon that made Hitler chancellor?
Of course, a writer like me couldn't become a speechmaker overnight.
I'd approach radio gradually.
It wouldn't be too late after raising public recognition first.
'I need to write books too; things are about to get busy.'
Of course, my surroundings would get busy too.
A general of imperial blood, quiet until now, starting political moves.
But for now, no need to worry.
'Right now,' I have no intention of launching a coup.
Everything comes after my preparations are complete.
'I drew my sword once, but honed that blade for over a decade.'
A line Sima Yi left for his ancestor right after the Gaoping Mausoleum Incident in an old Romance of the Three Kingdoms drama.
Like Sima Yi, I'll start honing my blade from now.
For the day it is unsheathed.