War Never Again #6
Whether Japan's political elite raged at Britain or Korea kept churning out bonds without end—Britain moved with ruthless speed. Yeah, they did exactly what they wanted. They forced loans on both Korea and Japan, stamped approval for the gold standard, and established the first foreign exchange banks in East Asia.
"Don't pull stupid stunts like a common currency when you don't even have gold to back it."
With that warning, Britain sliced through the crisis like a hot knife through butter. When the mighty British Eastern Fleet docked in Osaka under the pretext of "escorting gold," Japan suddenly found itself remarkably good at anger management. Britain was pleased with the response. Why had they anchored in Osaka instead of Okinawa, where they'd promised to set up the exchange bank? No Japanese dared ask. At least not in the East, where Britain was top dog.
Japan's dogeza—their attempt to play great power in East Asia—was, from Britain's perspective, a most satisfying sight. This signaled a shift: Britain's Eastern policy was turning more interventionist. As Japan started hiding more from Britain, London decided direct involvement beat using proxies.
And right on cue, Arthur's report on Korea arrived. The result? Even gold, which Italy hadn't yielded during its worst humiliation in Ethiopia, began to flow. Britain thought: "If we're intervening anyway, let's make it count."
With Russia probing Afghanistan lately, Britain had no choice but to prepare troops there too. Create yet another enemy eyeing India? Unacceptable. No appetite for such money-losing expeditions. So they hijacked Japan's "Japan-Korea Economic Community."
A continental power like Korea and a maritime one like Japan sharing a single currency? It was like merging America's East and West coasts. Hell, more like the West crawling under the East. Public opinion wouldn't have it, but Britain's cabinet felt a twinge of threat. The world was crowded enough. The idea of an "America" emerging in Asia irked the ladies of London.
So Britain ensured "the iron hammer and the anvil didn't get too cozy"—in other words, kept Korea and Japan from direct contact—by dragging it into the public sphere.
"Japan-Korea Economic Community? No way! Single currency? Dream on!"
"Anglo-Japan-Korea Economic Community? Fine. I'll lend you more gold!"
Britain was firm. They wouldn't tolerate Korea and Japan scheming without their mediator. Military bloc, economic union, Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—none of it.
In the end, the Supreme Leader's plan to wrestle Japan like a WWE match and snag a chew toy spectacularly failed. Britain checked Japan's bid for East Asia dominance, and Japan took it on the chin. Thanks to Britain's timely meddling, Japan remained in recession. Still buying rice at rock-bottom prices, still stockpiling consumer goods. Now under deflationary pressure too.
"Lending money upfront, then robbing you blind behind your back."
Above all, joining the gold standard got Japan only the right to "squeeze" raw materials from Southeast Asia like the other powers. Without massive investment, Southeast Asia's value as an export market was depressingly low. In short, Japan's gains boiled down to slightly lower production costs. Just that one thing.
But factoring in gold standard downsides, even that was pathetic. It required diverting Taiwan investment funds and part of Britain's gold loan to Southeast Asia—impossible without huge bleeding. Japan's politicians and tycoons were bitterly disappointed by Britain's cold shoulder.
And someone even more sensitive to Japan's plight than the Japanese themselves? The Supreme Leader of the neighboring Korean Empire.
"The gap between Britain and Japan is bigger than I thought."
I'd imagined an Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but this was their "alliance"?
Originally, I'd planned to link our currencies with Korea's money and gold circulation minimized to the extreme. In a way, parasitizing Japan's central bank gold reserves. Like offloading America's Bretton Woods role onto Japan.
That was my vision. If gold standard was inevitable, why not join with leverage and good optics?
It was a decent deal. Mainly because Japan played the sucker. Plus, we'd regain tariff autonomy and dodge most-favored-nation pitfalls.
Who caused Japan's gold shortage and near-collapse? Simple: I'd just loosen my purse strings a bit. I had no intention of being the full mark, but playing firefighter? Sure. I'm not de Gaulle, after all.
But it blew up spectacularly. Britain shattered the balance of power diplomacy and made an even bolder move, blowing past my grand design. Japan promptly dogeza'd.
State-wise, Korea's losses weren't huge. Forced gold standard, foreign banks, "independence guaranteed" rubber-stamp making us a protectorate externally. Standard stuff for nations back then. Belgium and Netherlands were Britain's "protectorates" too, right? No unequal treaties or extraterritoriality—we were treated better than raw colonies. At least they bothered talking.
But the problem? I'd laid a small "raise" in the process, exposing some of my hand to Britain.
And that, I saw as the real damage.
Prodding Japan gently, only to get caught red-handed by Britain: "What games are you playing?"
I eyed the newly arrived British envoy alongside the Dutch one.
'Netherlands, Indonesia...'
After the Dutch East India Company spectacularly crashed, the Netherlands reclaimed control. Now, the Dutch Indonesian branch served as my slush fund conduit in Southeast Asia.
Victim and detective showing up together? Bad sign for me. Against my calculations, this shouldn't have happened.
A little more slip-up, and they'd swarm demanding most-favored-nation treaties.
Luckily—or unluckily—their unified statement was crystal clear. Dutch "confession-not-confession," British chorus.
The rubber plantation funded by Dutch royals? It hinged on my payment guarantee.
Objectively, even with rubber trees as collateral, the Dutch accepting "full post-payment" was fishy. Sadly, back then I couldn't grasp that far. It was Korea, not Empire yet; I wasn't Supreme Leader.
A time when I could squeeze but not yield.
In hindsight, though, Britain's "teacher," the Netherlands, lent land on shaky collateral: uncertain rubber trees. And Britain sniffed it out.
They pressured the Dutch, extracted the truth, and showed up here. Ruthless persistence, detective skills, bulldog tenacity.
"Your Excellency, does Korea truly lack gold?"
The golden truth was slowly emerging before Detective Arthur's eyes. He closed them slowly.
Leaving the two envoys stunned by a glimpse into my overseas assets' abyss, I pointed higher with a finger.
"Korea has no money, but I've quite the stockpile of personal assets."
"Can all this really be private wealth?"
Scale dwarfing Indonesia's rubber farms. Scattered worldwide. A backwater dictator's piggy bank?
Pure shadow capital. Too vast, growing too fast for mere slush funds.
For the first time, Arthur saw the Oriental before him as a true capitalist.
How'd he amass global capital like this? The world economy was in the Great Depression—no depression like it.
Yet this guy? To Arthur, impossible without a British heavyweight backing him. Otherwise, how from this eastern edge?
Suddenly, everything in this eastern fringe felt suspicious. Why did the powers tolerate Korea's conquest of North China? Why treat local bonds like money? Why couldn't Japan muster strength?
Setting aside the rest, Korea commanded respect without a proper navy.
I'd accepted the flow unquestioned, but reconsidering: blatant anomaly. No tariffs, seamlessly joining Britain's world strategy? Dig deeper—Britain gained zilch from Korea.
Britain wanted no more Russian tussles. Germany and America were building dreadnoughts apace.
So continental buffer: Ottoman, Afghanistan, Korean Empire sealing three flanks. But unlike those two battered states, this eastern speck took no hits—yet stood tall, respected by Britain just for existing.
After Japan's dogeza, it felt even weirder. I'd pegged it as "negligible regional power," "Japan's sphere and prey." Japan claimed as much.
But the board's turns didn't fit. For that to hold, Japan's recession should've hit here too—like Belgium/Netherlands with Britain's.
Yet to Arthur's own eyes, Korea was poor but never recessed. Unlike rice-munching Japanese, Koreans ate meat, skin slick with oil.
Not just happy faces. Post-gold standard, bond values should've dropped, curbing reckless issuance. Normally, in recession, bonds need sky-high rates to sell.
What firm issues high-rate bonds in downturn for aggressive investment? None.
Yet here, short-term bonds circulated like cash. Someone—somewhere—still pumped them at low rates!
To outsiders: blatant abnormality. He'd never seen a "recession" market like this.
Thus: not a recession.
Recession or not, these bonds functioned as currency here. Arthur had chalked it up to backward barter-to-money transition.
But with gold standard money circulating, value-stable, they still used bonds like cash.
Each fact alone? Plausible. World not always rational.
But—
Bond quasi-monetization + shadow-capital titan = horrifying picture unfolding before Arthur.
Artificial. Designed. Orchestrated.
By someone. High odds: the man before him.
Perhaps Arthur had met the architect of this grand national scam.