The Oil That Tips the Scales
Of course, there were other reasons for my trip to the Soviet Union, but the fundamental one was that oil had been discovered in the Korean Empire. With oil now flowing, it was finally time to negotiate. Up until then, we'd been getting our oil from the Soviets by train and truck. Naturally, that had its limits, nowhere near the output from our newly tapped fields. Ships would have been better, but the only sea between the Korean Empire and the Soviet Union was... Siberia? Yeah, right.
But there was one way to push past those limits: build a bridge and lay pipelines. Up to now, the Korean Empire had been jointly constructing pipelines with the Soviets. They'd provide the land and a share of their oil in exchange for us building the pipes and doing the drilling. But that was just a tiny fraction of Russia's vast natural resources, obviously. The share we'd been promised was limited to whatever we could reach from our side. And like all such resource deals, even with those shares locked in, they'd start whining about insufficient extraction volumes or low oil prices, dragging their feet.
Basically, the oil fields were on Soviet soil. So the Korean Empire had no choice but to cut some kind of deal with them—ideally sooner rather than later. There was some merit to the military faction's push to strike the Soviets now. Once those pipelines were complete, we'd never be able to attack. We'd be dependent on them for oil. But even after finishing the pipelines and getting the oil, we'd still end up crawling back for more. Because the source was in the Soviet Union.
So the Korean Empire needed to hit the Soviets before the pipelines were done and seize those fields by force. Not a bad argument at all.
For now, our stock was high, but with the military pulling out in droves, when it came to oil, the Soviets would step up for their people and their own interests. Crying betrayal or "this violates our agreement" wouldn't mean shit. The problem was, even if we tried diplomatic negotiations, the Soviets would see it as an opening to demand more—like the Korean-Soviet alliance we absolutely opposed. They called it an alliance, but it was really just "join our revolution."
Of course, we wanted to be friendly with the Soviets, not become the Soviets. That's why, without a proper negotiation position, we'd keep losing leverage and opportunities. We had chips aplenty, but no good cards to play. Throw them now, and they'd all go all-in against us.
But then we struck oil? Now we're talking.
The moment oil was discovered, I ordered production estimates multiplied by ten and the excess buried again for now. No plans to team up with the Soviets for an OPEC-style cartel—that would just drive prices up. My thinking was the opposite: partner with them to revolutionize oil prices. Ditch the OPEC-style price-fixing. Or at least free bilateral trade from those inflated multilateral cartel rates. And the Korean Empire's oil was the key to that.
Only I knew how much oil we had. Plenty of room to bluff. That's when I started planning the Lenin mausoleum visit. I figured dangling our "vast" reserves—barely tapped—would make for a solid trade. If we could leverage our oil, backed by security logic, to pry open their economically viable Soviet fields, it'd be a massive win. The second they ramped up Soviet oil production, I could shove in my chips.
The catch? Those commie bastards could do the same if they dangled the Korean-Soviet alliance. I eyed Trotsky as he declared Soviet oil belonged to the Soviet people. For them, it was just oil; for us, it was more than that. An easy negotiation in theory, tough in practice.
His comrade had said it: not America, Britain, France, or Germany. The Korean Empire. The Soviets needed to watch us closely. To Soviet people friendly with Koreans, it might sound odd. But Trotsky got it perfectly.
The Korean Empire mirrored the Soviets in key ways: latecomer, ideologically opposed to the old order, and bold enough to revolutionize when needed. Look at our democratization. We had the potential and execution to leap from proletarian dictatorship straight to communism.
That was the problem. We had the power, will, and know-how—but our goalpost was just slightly off. To the council, we were heretics, mutants, objects of study and rejection. As Lenin said, entities to beware.
Yet the Soviet Central Committee and chairman saw compromise potential. The council aimed for world revolution; we focused inward. So we'd never interfere with theirs—probability approaching zero. No reason a Soviet that compromised with reactionaries couldn't with us. Especially since we were pro-Soviet now. No need to pick a fight.
The issue was our attitude. We'd been lukewarm internationally, but I didn't expect it toward their council. Even with their full Soviet course laid out, ghosting them entirely? They'd budgeted for a welcome, and I didn't show until after the chairman died. Visiting the mausoleum now? What kind of guy is this?
Trotsky didn't show it. The man before him was one Lenin warned about. A constant headache.
And the oil talk droning on all day? Same deal. He knew damn well why we were here, yet parroted his lines like a myna bird. No hints offered. But the council was diplomatically isolated right now. We claimed they wanted us pushing for council seats in the League of Nations, but was it active or passive? Just vote and say "we tried"?
Ironically, their only "friendly" tie was Germany—both isolated, compromising over Polish civil war and ethnic strife. Us? Not isolated at all. We preached non-alignment and isolationism while shaking hands worldwide. So Korean-Soviet diplomacy was inherently unequal. They suspected—rightly or not—that we were isolating them diplomatically. Our mere existence constrained their moves. With internal compromises like the Duma local councils, our presence hugely hampered their revolution front.
Time to settle accounts. While this Supreme Leader, this General Secretary, was wrapping up and stepping back. No second chances. Post-democratization, convincing us would be impossible. Democracy meant the end of revolution, after all.
The council's interests didn't perfectly align with ours, so negotiate now. Whether we were pressuring them was unclear, but the key to ending their isolation sat before them.
At minimum, elevate from one-sided Korean protection to mutual defense treaty.
Absolutely no getting dragged into Soviet messes. For someone long using them as a shield, being pulled along was off the table.
A bit earlier. Truth is, the Korean Empire had planned for an oil-less world. We'd never had domestic oil. Even Britain, with global reach, ran some ships on coal. Relying solely on oil was risky for us.
So we made one sector oil-independent: logistics. Our freighters used coal boilers by default. Trains were steam locomotives. Only trucks ran diesel. Despite viable diesel engines for ships and trains.
Why? An oil embargo would cripple us halfway; killing logistics would finish us. Tolerating inefficiency to survive. Our oil discovery meant we could expand diesel somewhat.
But as Supreme Leader—still wielding shadow government influence amid democratization—I demanded improving steam boilers instead. Ships and trains didn't need compactness; why diesel?
The masses want cheap. Efficiency via diesel sounds great. But universal diesel adoption weakens our leverage, and the fallout hits them. Peaceful cheapness is nice, but war's constant—risk skyrockets.
Instead, I offered alternatives: German coal liquefaction and boiler upgrades. Self-reliance, Juche-style. People struggled to grasp heavy coal boilers over good oil/diesel, but we pushed on. Replace oil everywhere except logistics.
Electric trolleys or trains over diesel—embargo hits, and we'd shut down otherwise. That vulnerability made us the "desperate ones." The world preys on the desperate.
Eventually, the grad student—no, lab director—got shredded.
"You want us to build boilers even Britain can't yet?"
"Guri boilers—no, at least double- or triple-burn ones."
"How?"
"Adapt tech that reburns exhaust gases from coal."
"?"
"Why not? I'm not asking for 30% like diesel—just bump our 6-10% to 15%."
Boosting thermal efficiency—was that too much? In my era's context, coal boilers thrashed to survive diesels. Innovation era. Proper investment? Doable.
"Aim for 30% anyway."
"...Yes, sir."
From 6% to 30%. Burn five times more with the same coal—that was the Supreme Leader's demand facing the researchers.