Only the Strong Choose Peace
Some people say that war isn't the answer—only dialogue and compromise can solve problems. They claim war just washes blood with more blood. I basically agree. Peace? Sounds great, doesn't it?
The problem is that dialogue, compromise, and even peace are choices only the strong can make. It always starts with the strong making concessions. Of course, the strong know this full well. So when they decide dialogue is needed, they make one of two gestures: solve it by force, or solve it by talking.
The weak are the ones yelling to stop the "solve it by force" option. But here's the issue—the weak have no power to restrict the strong's choices. That's why they're weak in the first place. We define them that way.
So the weak usually whine. They whine for dialogue, begging, "Let's talk it out." If that works, the strong—who currently need dialogue—have no choice but to concede and negotiate. And that's exactly what the weak want. It's not a conversation; it's dragging everyone to the negotiation table. And they want to come with something resembling equal bargaining power.
Here's the thing with the Korean Empire. We're structured around base pay that's modest but shares a portion of sales revenue—more like a cooperative of big self-employed operators partnering with smaller ones, rather than bosses and employees. So concepts like subcontractors or labor-management disputes don't really take root here. Instead, it's all about business partners. That structure makes boss-subordinate dynamics hard to establish from the start. Tech partnerships and personnel exchanges thrive naturally. You can't disrespect each other's business turf.
The problem is, most of the world isn't like that. It's full of workers who clock in for a paycheck under some boss, thinking, "Just pay me my salary." They're inherently closed-off. Profits get monopolized by the boss, investors, and full-timers. And right now, people in the Korean Empire don't quite grasp this. Or rather, they do—but they see it as backward, like old Joseon ways.
As folks who prioritize mutual respect, we naturally reject it. I taught them that myself. That's why, even though we rationally understand boss-subordinate dynamics and know when we're the "subordinate," our resistance to being treated like one is weak. Take Lee Wan-yong—he'd rather just give what's asked than play hardball. I do the same; whenever possible, I hand it over.
The Korean Empire has succeeded by always giving what's due—against superiors and even comrades. It worked because when we extended a hand with something to offer, they reciprocated since they had something to give too.
The problem is now, as the Korean Empire grows into a giant. As the number of partners we can clasp hands with dwindles, that's the real issue.
Now we face hordes of "subordinates." Just like America did back in the day. We'd have to abandon bargaining power and eat some unfair deals in every transaction. If we were like America or Britain—obsessed with world history—we could give big short-term and recoup small long-term.
But regardless, most of these subordinates we'll face will come demanding first. "Why give to them but not me?" they'll say, preaching equal trade while tossing out ridiculous empty promises to lure our investments. Once our influence grows strong, they'll use us as leverage to pull in others: "Korea invested, so you should too."
Hard to complain about that. We've walked that path ourselves. Do it right, and the country thrives.
"Give me" isn't just for random schmucks.
"No clear solution, huh?"
"Probably not, sir."
Marathon meetings with my comrades for days on end changed nothing. No real answers yet. Britain's shit is still stinking up the world, so they don't demand outright—but as Britain fades, the demands will ramp up. Comparing us to America, the Soviets, Britain, wherever—they'll come sniffing for treats.
That's why the Korean Empire aimed to tag along modestly rather than chase hegemony. If it's this bad without being top dog, imagine if we were.
"But we can't lean on Britain forever."
"True."
Britain's the kind you keep at arm's length—never ride to the end. The Pacific-Atlantic Economic Community splits around us and Great Britain as poles. No matter how big we get, we're just using each other. That's perfect.
Long-haul partners? America or the Soviets.
"France first."
France, desperate for American help on Algeria, tossed Indochina to the wolves. The kicker? This Indochina is the real deal—from Burma to South China Sea to Malaya, a massive swath. France's control never fully reached it anyway, but that's irrelevant. What matters is that a huge territory lost its ruling power overnight. No elections, no handover anyone recognized.
France figured with Korea, Japan, China, and Britain around, they could preserve influence. Yeah, right. Now Indochina's ethnic minorities are screaming for their own nations, locked in disputes. United against France before, they plunged into civil war the moment France bailed.
"Roughly Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand."
China was my screw-up there, but on Indochina? I'm 100% innocent. Thailand's collapse baffles me still. British-level skill, but why? Motive's murky.
The real issue isn't Indochina's collapse—it's that the people there don't see it that way. France doesn't either. They're whining to us: "This isn't what we agreed!" We gave them the seed bank, so why'd their influence vanish?
France wanted liberation under American pressure but kept the influence for easy recolonization. Fair enough.
But the ex-colonials are making similar demands—except France is bossing from strength, while they're begging from weakness. They don't want pure independence from France but crave the old perks of the French economic bloc. Plenty left to squeeze from France, they think. And they want us as the conduit.
Someone who can sway France—step in and "mediate" for us. "Mediate" my ass; with no leverage, it's just "do it for us."
They're after reparations or loans—anything to compromise with France. Can't become the next Haiti, right?
Not wrong.
Respect France's faded influence a bit, and negotiation's possible. We haven't threatened nationalization yet. Room to talk. Keeps some old privileges too. Sure, risks recolonization—but that's future them's problem. For now, they'll beg us, America, or Britain. Paint France as the villain.
Can't blame 'em. Without our support, borrow from the old master, right? They know it's their shot—France is desperate now. Miss it, and it's hell: build governments, win recognition, bootstrap economies.
"What I don't get is why Britain or America aren't jumping in on Indochina."
"They're both pushing decolonization, aren't they?"
"Then that's why they should move now. No better time to project influence without the 'colony' label."
Balkans, Eastern Europe—Soviets collapsed, West planted factories. Can't complain. Better than colonies.
"Still, we have to intervene."
France demanded it, and we're eating their money. Can't outright refuse.
"Come to think of it, Wilson mocked Britain's Commonwealth as neo-colonialism."
"…"
Is it okay to say that in front of us?
The moment my comrades clammed up, the Supreme Leader—party secretary—winked one eye and delved into Wilson's mind.
Wilson wouldn't ignore Southeast Asia. So his silence was odd. Tearing down British and French empires is his top goal—why skip this?
…Got it.
"I see."
He's probably eyeing me right now. Korea's liberation of Japan and Taiwan? Too close geographically and economically—they can't cut us loose even if we did. To prove no colonial ambitions, we'd need to abandon Southeast Asia. No meddling.
If America dismantles Britain and France just for Korea to fill the void? Korea wins big. That's what they're guarding against. Full Korean intervention in Indochina? They'd slam the brakes, paint us as the bad guys.
Guess I need to call the Democrats.
Wilson, you think I'll let it go your way?
The Korean Empire proposed a five-power trusteeship over Indochina to America and the Democrats: Korea, America, Britain, France, Japan. A curtain to quell the chaos—and slip America the poisoned chalice.