Wicked Alliance #7
When France opened the Algerian front, the Korean Empire was utterly crushed by sheer madness. The aftermath was massive in every way. To be honest, it felt like we'd fucked up big time from the Supreme Leader's perspective. I never imagined they'd actually open a new front in the middle of all this.
But what was done was done. We shoved the oil, iron, and rubber that France was desperately demanding right down their throats, then turned our attention away from the Western Front again. Whether France scrapped with Italy or not, what did it have to do with us anyway? The real issue was France being pushed to the absolute brink right now. France's colonies and the regions under its influence were far bigger problems for the Korean Empire.
Because they'd suddenly jammed troops into Algeria, French prestige was plummeting worldwide. Places where France had once wielded influence—like China, where they'd tried to flex in the past; Africa and Indochina, still under their thumb; and Indonesia, where they eyed future gains—were all facing a French vacuum. They'd thrown every spare asset into holding Algeria while fighting Germany.
And so, the Korean Empire stepped in to patch up the mess that was France. It wasn't just because France, under intense U.S. pressure laced with condemnation, begged us to handle the independence of Indochina—the legacy of that clown-king Napoleon III sacrificed in their stead—or because they sold off their now half-worthless rights and bonds in China, overrun by warlords, or proposed joint ventures for French interests in Indonesia.
Those were secondary reasons, if anything. 'Britain wants to dismantle its colonial empire while keeping its core interests intact. But if France, the colonial powerhouse, sinks completely or becomes irreparable under U.S. demands in the meantime?' If America checks France too hard and succeeds, it risks turning into Britain vs. America. The old order trying to bow out gracefully versus the new order itching to jeer. We'd end up caught in the crossfire, ripe for a stab in the ribs.
We'd already agreed with Britain on an economic community and with America on shifting the world's next agenda to decolonization. The problem was, without colonial France trolling just enough to stir the pot, we'd be the ones getting skewered. Especially with the Soviet headache already pounding!
In that sense, absurdly enough, my Korean Empire was forced into helping salvage French influence in their colonies amid the fallout from France's Algerian lunge. Sure, liberating them now would feel great for me personally, but it'd make us the sacrificial lamb in the next setup. We had to liberate French colonies long-term—but either alongside British ones or not right now. Of all times, only France's were ripening for release at this exact moment.
France's Algerian push had slammed their position to rock bottom, making it impossible for America to let them off easy. Not post-war liberation, but demands to free them now, mid-war.
'And France threw Indochina under the bus to hold Algeria.'
"I never thought France would actually send troops to Algeria."
I figured their obsession with Algeria was natural, but you had to pick your moments. With Paris threatened by Germany, charging into Algeria? Even though it was reality, it was unbelievable. I'd assumed they'd reclaim it later at best. My plans were all diplomatic blocks if France showed Algerian ambitions again. I never dreamed they'd shove troops in now.
'The trench lines break, and Paris falls in under a week...!'
Opening a two-front war amid that? My chest swelled just thinking about it. France and Germany were locked in historic tank battles on the Western Front right now, making it worse.
I knew what the world's uncivilized nations desperately wanted from the Korean Empire. We'd fielded these requests countless times, day after day. Capital, steel, electricity—that was the usual list. Sure, I thought coal or engines were needed too, but those could be subbed with their own labor. Exploit their workforce to cover it; not as critical as the big three.
So they begged us for those. Things utterly out of their reach. Slightly better-off nations asked for oil, skilled personnel exchanges, trade hubs. Same deal—unsolvable for them. Essential but rarely given. We lacked them too. Unlike capital, steel, or electricity—where a bit sufficed—these were better the more you had.
At this point, I felt the era demanded some concessions. We could spare some steelmaking tech. More precisely, Korean Empire steel tech was on par with Britain, America, Germany. Bessemer converters spewing enough molten steel daily to last other nations a year. But those converters needed not just tech—capital, infrastructure, and steady demand to consume the output.
You couldn't just plop one down and expect it to work. So I had no plans to build them. Most needed to import steel first anyway. For them, I'd recommend more outdated, less efficient but low-capital, appropriate-tech furnaces. Perfectly fitting.
Europe's resident chinaman, France, was expert in that. I'd run this steel venture under both Korean and French names—it was that crucial. Preserve French influence enough to irk America and Britain. France, iron-short themselves, would cooperate on steel plants in colonies or prospective ones, holding shares.
Of course, their "cooperation" now—mid-war, colonies teetering on independence—wouldn't mean cutting-edge converters or massive capital. No reason to invest big. But even that modest investment was enough to implant steelmaking in colonies, I figured. They couldn't outcompete our steel anyway, so building basic plants for their industrialization was fine.
'The unsold iron goes domestic.'
We could always find uses for iron in the Korean Empire. That's how we rolled—just-in-time principles.
"Was it here?"
The project I'd prepped to ruin China long ago opened from my drawer. Detailing why backyard furnaces failed—and how to avoid it.
Yeah. Time to spark their steel leap. Post-war slump recovery via construction, right? We could fund orders, stomach Anglo-French hostility, but they'd build with their own hands. Even if just a brief reprieve, they'd grasp at it desperately.
Mao Zedong's and the Communists' disastrous backyard furnaces emerged from the shadows.
Surprisingly, "it fails" implies it worked before—meaning there was something to fail with. China was a nation that failed at steelmaking, so it had that "something." They'd forged steel with natural gas since Zhuge Liang's era.
Industrial Revolution equals steel production? By that metric, China had one since the Song Dynasty. Just wrecked by endless horsemen. Mao's confidence had basis. If civilians crudely made steel, scaling nationally should yield a steel leap, right?
Obviously not. Steel's like glassmaking—top artisans only, from Three Kingdoms to 21st century. No exceptions. China just had tons of them thanks to population. Grinding people into steel—that was ancient China.
The issue? Mao thought, "More people, more steel?" He ignored frontline experts, ordering know-nothings to build furnaces and smelt. Doomed to fail.
In the West, with accumulated tech and capital, even mixing experts and Irish peasants worked—systematized. But China's apprenticeship-based steelmaking hinged on skilled hands. Quality fuel mattered when people were the engine.
Mao poured unrefined tar into a high-end sports car. Artisans and all warned it was broken—he called it classist mindset and charged ahead.
The worst part? China wasn't steel-less; it used steel masterfully. Mao's fuckup regressed it temporarily to no-steel stone age—or Three Kingdoms era.
Had it never used steel, they'd revert fine. But over 1,000 years of steel-dependent life? Productivity crashed, people dropped dead. Mao did what even Mongols couldn't. Like flooding a monetary economy with junk coins or seizing fertilizer from farms. No wonder deaths piled up.
Backyard furnaces held disastrous potential. Build plants? Furnaces? If no proper steel comes out, what's the point?
So we didn't. Built proper plants instead.
Does that mean backyard furnaces are total bunk? Nah. Mao fucked up plenty, but wasn't a total idiot. He'd have lost the civil war otherwise. He beat Chiang in the retard Olympics.
Common sense: Build cement plants near big apartments; steel plants for industrialization. Seemed reasonable. Method sucked, but recognizing the need was baseline sane.
From my research, they'd work better than expected. Low yield in modern Korea, but for steel-poor nations paying premiums on imports? Viable.
We imported know-how from Japan/Britain, looted China for capital. They...? Britain won't industrialize them—lend money, sabotage via corrupt locals and regs.
World iron ore? Hoovered by West and us. They'd pay through the nose.
So if ore's insane, backyard smelting local scrap, pig iron, minor ores makes sense. Local inputs cut heavy industry shipping costs. Low capital favors cheap-labor spots—labor cost becomes a plus.
Assuming usable steel, downsides: low output, hard exports. Shoddy quality, low volume. Exporting kills local advantages. Ancient method, even upgraded, has limits.
But sufficient for now. We weren't building them full plants anyway—against their pleas. Britain, France, anyone would freak if we did in their turf. That's colonial steel leap—Germany tried, look what happened.
So electricity, water, coal, iron, tractors—that's our limit. Rest, DIY.
We couldn't be sugar daddies lending cash; better as helpful friends.
'With Europe's chinaman France, we can build backyard furnaces making real—if lower-quality—steel locally. To preserve their influence, even more so.'
Post-war, just order buildings from those nations. It'll irk Anglo-French some, but a fair compromise past the line.