The Heart of the Revolution #3
There was no harmony whatsoever among the Korean Empire and the British Empire on whether it should be the Eastern Front or the Southern Front, Jerusalem or Israel, building it in the Sinai Peninsula or in Palestine, advancing into the Soviet Union or protecting it—opinions clashed on every single point.
But that didn't mean Britain slapped Korea across the face. "If anything, Korea has every reason to flip out." Britain knew full well that while it shook Korea down, the collapse of the Eastern Front was a risk for Korea too; establishing Israel instead of Jerusalem was a massive risk for oil-dependent Korea in the Middle East; and above all, a rampaging red bear on the border was an unspeakable risk.
Of course they'd tread carefully. Britain just figured Korea could afford to take a harder line on this, but Korea had always pursued appeasement wherever it tangled with Britain. Complaining now that Korea was sticking to appeasement would be pretty awkward.
The real issue was Britain's national interest. Britain understood Korea's position perfectly but acted—and had to act—for its own sake. To that end, to draw in America later and to avoid yielding too much to America while doing so, Britain absolutely needed Korea's reentry into the war. That would boost their negotiating power.
Fortunately or unfortunately, the two nations didn't descend into an emotional brawl. Korea wanted Britain to back off a bit on the Soviet issue, so it left room for compromise elsewhere; Britain, meanwhile, quietly worried about Korea leaning too hard toward America, so there were finger-pointing jabs but no outright slaps.
Neither could afford the fallout. Above all, Britain and Korea surprisingly saw eye-to-eye on one thing: global stability. They just differed on the hierarchy.
Britain pursued Rule Britannia, while Korea chased rules excluding that. Korea saw the stability Britain maintained as utterly unsustainable.
And if Britain learned that Korea was eyeing America and the Soviet Union as Britain's replacements, the emotional war would erupt right then. But Britain couldn't even imagine Korea dropping Britain's hand for Russia's. Britain was handing over oil and sea routes—why would continental powerhouse Korea link arms with fellow continental powerhouse Russia?
To Britain, Korea had joined the war to protect its interests in Russia, not out of true loyalty to Russia. Why bother with such a money-losing venture for France or anyone else?
On the contrary, Britain was extremely wary of Korea cozying up to America after this war. The U.S., fresh off the Republican infighting, impeachment fallout, and the Democrats' rise, kept urging Britain to dismantle its colonial order and end the Anglo-Korean alliance.
Democratic America—Woodrow Wilson's America, 1917 America—cared more about domestic reform than imperialism or hegemony, unlike the old Republican era. Hadn't they lost their banner over the slavery reform agenda? Freed slaves were still slaves, and now they couldn't just re-enslave or deport the deported ones.
So Democratic supporters saw this as their chance to step up as reformers, progressives. With Republican progressive Theodore Roosevelt fallen, they'd claim the flag.
The catch: they couldn't lose their home base. Abandoning the influence bought with money would destabilize the already chaotic domestic politics.
Thus, Wilson wasn't an imperialist right now but had to posture as one, dipping into world affairs just enough. That way, Americans would unquestioningly believe in U.S. hegemony.
To achieve that, Wilson had to, in some form, eliminate America's rivals. "The Anglo-Korean alliance ends here." To suppress and embrace the Black Dragon bandits in the American West and the simpletons in the South for domestic reform, he had to dismantle the threatening Anglo-Korean alliance with his own hands. Only then could America pour money and time into reform over hegemony.
Otherwise, security issues would keep popping up endlessly. Security logic was a powerful driver, but a double-edged sword—one that might cut Wilson himself.
The Democrats, with their history of trying to drag Britain into civil war, couldn't easily compromise on security either. And right now, America's security problem was that Anglo-Korean alliance.
Strictly speaking, America didn't care about the Russian hicks calling themselves Soviets—it just needed to handle the Anglo-Korean duo. To Wilson, the Soviet Union, or Soviet Federation, could even become a potential ally, like the federal U.S.
In the end, Korea eyed the Soviet Union, America, and Britain; Britain eyed the Soviet Union, Korea, and America; America eyed Britain, Korea, and the Soviet Union. That was the situation, with everyone exchanging subtle glances over the Soviets' emergence.
Whether France and Germany hammered out a deal or not, Britain, America, and Korea couldn't care less about the positions of Germany and France, whose lands were being scorched.
Britain just wanted Korea to open a new front and negotiate with America; America wanted Britain to accept the era and retreat to the back room; Korea wanted everyone else to buzz off or get shoved out itself.
But there was always one nation oblivious to the subtleties: Italy.
Italy sensed this was its big score, courted relentlessly by the great powers. "The fiasco in Libya, the stale North-South rift, the left-right clashes—I'll end them all with my own hands."
The Duce seized real power and stepped up, succeeding to a degree. Ethiopia aside, Libya was occupied, Vatican reconciled, Britain's investments flowed south, Korea's north.
Gold kept coming via Switzerland from Germany. What golden opportunity was this?
But that's why the Duce knew: in this no-regrets situation, now was the time to demand big. So he did.
"France shall return French Tunisia to Italian Libya. And French Jerusalem to the Vatican, at least nominally."
"Britain shall recognize Italy as Rome's successor and return Egypt to Rome."
Everyone figured the bastard was using this chance to rebuild Rome. Bold demands.
But even for desperate France, fine—but ironically, Britain found the proposal not half bad. France out of the Mediterranean? Britain's gain. Egypt? Lately, it barely listened. Hell, they'd sliced off Sudan and handed it to Korea.
The issue was the canal... But with France, a bit risky, Italy wouldn't dare cross Britain. And word was, Italy wouldn't eye the canal or Sinai.
Then sell those rebellious desert tribesmen to Italy? Sinai to the Jews, Egypt to Italy. In exchange, Britain maintains the world order? Right now, Britain couldn't abandon the Atlantic for security, the canal for sea routes, India for interests, Arabia for oil.
Egypt? Honestly, just cotton—one-trick pony. Use Indian cotton instead. Back when, they made it a protectorate for canal security, but Sinai could handle that.
But one nation spat blood over this great powers' backroom deal—not the Soviets yet, but America.
"If America intervenes, it's a just war, not a colonial one."
Italy demanding colonies while craving intervention hit the ex-colony America's berserk button perfectly. Against Italy's hardline colonial demands, America demanded even harder colonial liberation—not concessions to Italy, but liberation, liberation.
Even ex-Republican Theodore was demanding Irish freedom; Democrats had to push all colonies' dissolution to lead America—no, the world's—agenda.
Thus spewed ethnic self-determination. "Isn't that a good thing?" America's voice.
Of course Britain couldn't agree. Ireland was absurd enough—all colonies? But America's weight was essential on the Western Front. Only it could crush Germany. "France, Germany, Russia—none can profit."
The world was cramped, Europe crampeder. Britain's prescription: liberate Poland. Korea's: Hungary. Korea understood Europe needed buffer states now.
On that note, Britain inevitably needed some under-the-table deal with amenable Korea. America seemed to expect Great Britain's demise; make it look ruined enough, and it'd intervene satisfied.
Britain was convinced: no promise of imperial dismantlement, no U.S. intervention. Submarines? Skip trade ships if you must—Britain sinks without them, not America.
So better feign immediate ruin than delayed doom. He was Labour, but no Britain-hater.
"Fetch that absurd proposal Korea made before."
"You're serious, Prime Minister George? Parliament's one thing, but most cabinet undersecretaries will revolt."
Wartime cabinet allowed some overreach, but that proposal was still seen as a joke. Grant colonies federal autonomy, split the world into Atlantic and Pacific halves—currency realignment proposal.
To America, it'd scream: "Britain ditches gold standard and colonies, but vows to win hegemony war against you." Provocative manifesto.
If revealed, America intervenes on Western Front either way. Dismantle Anglo-Korea? Meaningless next to currency alliance. America would block Britain-Korea tightening further.
Then—'Britain's interests endure.' That sufficed.