The Fortress of Betrayal and Blasphemy, Part Two
I had already devised a solution for the greatest challenge in nuclear weapon miniaturization: critical mass.
"This time, I'll probably have to use a similar approach to the nuclear artillery shell."
In conventional terms, the lower limit of a nuclear bomb's yield is determined by its critical mass—a fact established by Einstein over eighty years ago. His famous equation implied that a nuclear bomb's power is proportional to energy, and energy in turn is proportional to mass. Applied to a standard plutonium fission bomb, this meant its yield would easily surpass the kiloton range.
A yield that posed problems for mixing among Cultured Slimes equipped with conventional high explosives. The issue was that it was too powerful. If I used it in Moscow on the day of the decisive battle, the chances of me being caught in the blast would be unacceptably high.
I found the answer in the recoilless rifles the Americans had developed decades ago. Since critical mass is closely tied to density, the standard approach was to first compress the central nuclear material using conventional high explosives. Alternatively, one could create a separate device to reflect neutrons and place it near the nuclear material. I knew that numerous nuclear backpacks developed during the Cold War had adopted these methods.
With Delis's help, I had combed through intelligence agency files and British government classified documents, confirming that the British Empire possessed the technical capability to implement both methods without difficulty.
Now the key was securing the nuclear material itself.
Of course, as I had verified during my visit to the Scottish naval base before returning to meet Elise, dismantling SLBMs would yield a certain amount of nuclear material. But I had no desire to drain my available forces just to fill my pockets. It felt like embezzling state funds to line my own pockets, if you will.
The organization should function independently of the state, and the state should function independently of the organization. The British Empire must remain fully operational even without the organization, and the Northern Covenant Syndicate must be able to function as before without British assistance.
It wasn't impossible to siphon British national power for the organization's private gain, but I wanted to avoid such actions as much as possible.
"So, Rin. Where to next? You just came back from America—planning to stay in London for a while?"
Elise asked me casually on the way back from our inspection of the human factory.
"No, I think I'll rest for a bit and then head out again. You could come with me, you know."
"I appreciate the offer, but no thanks. We need at least one witch in London to serve as a deterrent. But where are you planning to go?"
"Where else? Somewhere I can get pre-prepared nuclear material, of course."
Plutonium doesn't exist in nature, so if I wanted to obtain nuclear material naturally, uranium was the only option. And Britain, as it happened, was a country that had built a global nuclear material trade network. If I put my mind to it, tapping into that network wasn't out of the question.
"This too is a blessing of the British Empire."
Not in the sense of divine favor, but rather the remnants of the colonial era. A significant portion of Britain's uranium imports came from former colonial nations. Of course, by the dawn of the new millennium, they no longer used the "ignorant" name of colonies, opting instead for the more refined term of the Commonwealth. But the exploitative, near-plunder trade agreements forged during the colonial era still held their effect, even as the international community pretended to ignore them.
No, it wasn't near-plunder—it was outright plunder. I could say that today, the Empire's repulsive character had once again provided an option for my plans.
But I intended to treat this option as a secondary choice and pursue a more direct method. Obtaining natural uranium had the drawback of requiring enrichment to convert it back into plutonium. And since modern nuclear weapons don't use uranium alone, this was a necessary step. I didn't want to waste time on uranium enrichment, though I'd keep it as a fallback option. I just didn't want to make it my primary supply method.
Thus, I chose—
"Pre-prepared nuclear material... so you mean a country that isn't officially recognized as a nuclear power?"
"Yes, there are plenty of options. There are quite a few countries that casually ignore the Non-Proliferation Treaty as if it doesn't exist."
—Breaking into the arsenals of "unofficial" nuclear powers and brazenly stealing uranium and plutonium.
"Well... since they're keeping it secret themselves, they wouldn't be in a position to complain if someone stole it, would they?"
"If they did complain, that would be funny in itself. It'd be interesting to see how the international community reacts."
It was like a regular customer at a restaurant turned out to be a famous pickpocket, and Hong Gildong stole the pickpocket's stolen goods right from the restaurant. A good analogy. I see it clearly now.
Elise tapped her chin thoughtfully after hearing my answer.
"Hmm... Will it be as easy as you say? They'll know it's the lifeline of their nation, something they can't afford to lose. There'll be multiple layers of defense, right?"
She was right. Why had my past-life North Korea and Iran refused to abandon their nuclear programs despite all the Western world's threats, ultimately acquiring nuclear weapons? As long as the specter of mutual assured destruction haunted the world, like the ghost of communism haunting Europe, nuclear weapons served as a guarantee of national survival.
What if Hitler had acquired nuclear weapons before America? The postwar European order would have been restructured to further guarantee Germany's Lebensraum.
I tapped my tablet and handed it to Elise as I answered.
"Elise has a point. The key I'm considering is minimizing the distance to the nuclear material as much as possible."
"Right. If everyone started from the same point, it would be truly equal, but we don't need to do that. I think I get the gist."
Excluding the British SLBMs I didn't want to touch at this point, the closest nuclear material to me was undoubtedly on the Korean Peninsula. More precisely, the uranium mine in Pyongsan, North Hwanghae Province, and the uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities hidden nearby in Adumae.
Unlike the original timeline, the owner of Pyongsan in North Hwanghae Province wasn't the second Kim pig, but the original leader still alive under the blue roof. When I first visited South Korea, I had pored over documents related to South Korea's nuclear development at the residence of Ham Cheon-ho, the president of Cheonma Sangsa who had since become my puppet. I had stuffed those documents into Shattenmädchen's maw and brought them all the way to Britain, where they were now being analyzed by British nuclear experts.
A few days ago, while I was still staying in Florida, a British expert known for his nuclear knowledge had told me over a video call:
"At this level... yes, it appears sufficient for deployment. There's a high likelihood they've already completed operational deployment."
"What's the possibility the Americans noticed?"
"Quite high. There seems to have been some kind of backchannel deal. After all, the U.S. Forces Korea themselves have already loaded small nuclear bombs at Yongsan, Pyeongtaek, and Namyangju."
Investigations confirmed this was a clear fact. The presence of U.S. Forces Korea, one of the main reasons the Soviet Union and communist countries hesitated to make military provocations against South Korea, was further amplified by the nuclear weapons stockpiled at U.S. military bases.
"What kind of deal did Park Byung-hwi propose? And why did America keep this to themselves without informing other allies?"
"I can't say beyond that. As you know, Americans are quite calculating beneath their macho image."
"That's true. I'll call you again if needed. For now, log off."
Being able to order around high-level experts who could influence British national policy like subordinates was a clear advantage. There was certainly an opportunity to ask about the contents of the backchannel deal between America and South Korea, especially since I had received this news while in Florida.
But I had kept my mouth shut for now. If what I was touching was the eagle's (reverse scale), there was little benefit in provoking it at that moment. Perhaps the American Magic Defense Agency's policymakers, in their bluster, might have assumed I was merely asking a simple question, only for me to expose the truth.
The expected outcome would be one of two things: the Americans would try to bury me and my organization with all their might to cover their shame, or the story might leak out and accelerate President Clinton's lame duck period.
Neither was particularly welcome. As a power with the British Empire as its backing, I wouldn't lose the organization entirely even in a head-on clash, but going to war with America was still madness. And the latter scenario introduced too much future uncertainty.
President Bill Clinton's term lasted until 2001. Already mired in the Zippergate scandal—"Oral sex isn't sex," as he had claimed—he had lost some support. The proliferation of nuclear-armed states would be unwelcome news for him, even if those states were allies guarding the Far East against the communist threat.
The great powers were fundamentally rotten, instinctively unable to tolerate upstarts climbing the ladder. Their declaration that only they would share nuclear weapons "officially" was part of this international ladder-kicking.
Considering all this, I had not immediately asked Matthew W. Lewis about the backchannel deal between America and South Korea from Florida. The time to ask would come eventually. Both the organization's intelligence department and I agreed that waiting would be sufficient.
Thus, I intended to steal uranium and plutonium from the Korean Peninsula, and the plan was being meticulously coordinated through Delis, who headed the intelligence department, and the organization members stationed in South Korea and Japan.
The more I thought about it, the more I couldn't help but chuckle. The dictator Takagi, in his efforts to solidify his power and elevate the nation's status, had certainly ordered nuclear development. Yet here I was, a witch from afar, planning to steal all the warheads. If discovered, the repercussions would spread like wildfire.